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1. Introduction The countercyclical behavior of economic variables such as business
profits, labor income, and productivity reflects the swings in economic uncertainty (see
Bloom (2014) for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature). How increasing
uncertainty affects the dynamics in the business cycle has traditionally been analyzed within
the framework of irreversible investment (Abel (1983), Bernanke (1983), Abel and Eberly
(1994; 1996), Caballero (1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Bloom (2007; 2009) and
Bachmann et al. (2013a)). This approach considers a firm’s future investment opportunities
to be the real option. In other words, when making investment decisions under high
uncertainty, firms should wait until such uncertainty is resolved and the project is more
clearly successful or not.
On the contrary, spurred by the drastic increase in asset price volatility and the credit
crunch during the 2007–09 financial turmoil, an emergent body of the macroeconomic lit-
erature has emphasized financial frictions as an additional channel through which volatility
fluctuations have substantially unfavorable effects on the macroeconomy (Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2014), Christiano et al. (2014) and Gilchrist et al. (2014)). This ap-
proach predicts that increased uncertainty raises the user cost of capital, or the agency
cost (Bernanke et al. (1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)), through the interaction
between the heightened uncertainty and financial market frictions, thus leading firms with
higher agency costs to delever and inducing a decline in investment spending by firms with
internal financing constraints.
This empirical study contributes to both these strands of the literature on firm in-
vestment under high uncertainty. It uses firm-level consolidated data on the Japanese
manufacturing industry from fiscal years 2001 to 2014 to empirically examine their theo-
retical predictions in terms of whether and how investment sensitivity to a firm’s financing
conditions depends on fluctuations in uncertainty. While the two strands of the literature
on uncertainty and investment dynamics agree that uncertainty distorts the level of corpo-
rate investment through the cautionary and/or the financial friction channel, Bloom (2014)
highlights not only this level effect, but also a sensitivity effect that has received little at-
tention in the extant literature. We empirically test this sensitivity effect by focusing on
the role of a firm’s internal and external financing constraints through which fluctuations
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in uncertainty affect corporate investment dynamics.
To investigate whether and how fluctuations in uncertainty influence the sensitivity
dynamics (i.e., the impulse response of corporate investment to a marginal change in a
firm’s internal and external financing), we adopt a two-step approach to control for the
endogeneity of uncertainty. In the first step, we extract the purely exogenous shocks from
the firm- and macro-level uncertainty measures based on stock price volatility and the news
source of Japanese economic policy. This extraction of the uncertainty shocks prepares for
a randomized experiment followed by the second step: we include those uncertainty shocks
in a corporate investment equation with the interaction term of the uncertainty shocks and
a firm’s financing variables such as cash flows and debt issues. Through these empirical
steps, we set up a quasi-natural experiment with a randomized shock of uncertainty to
identify the dynamics in the causal link between uncertainty and investment–financing
sensitivity, particularly focusing on the interaction effect. Furthermore, we conduct the
weak instrument robust inference based on the Kleibergen (2005) testing procedure to
complement our causal analysis.
In the empirics, we provide two types of predictions about the dynamics in investment–
financing sensitivity in association with the level of uncertainty. According to the macroe-
conomic literature emphasizing the interaction effect between financial frictions and uncer-
tainty, high uncertainty limits a firm’s debt capacity because such heightened uncertainty—
under limited liability—favors its shareholders over its bondholders, thus inducing a decline
in the value of debt claims, exacerbating the debt overhang problem, and increasing the
cost of capital (see also Merton (1974) and Nakashima and Saito (2009)). This theoretical
insight is followed by the prediction that high uncertainty increases the sensitivity of corpo-
rate investment to financing variables, particularly internal financing ones, as dependence
on internal financing becomes larger because of the increase in the cost of external financing
and resulting severity of financing constraints.
The second prediction is an extension of the traditional wait-and-see effect under high
uncertainty. High uncertainty makes managers less sensitive to changes in the fundamental
economic conditions, including the cost of capital (see Bloom (2007; 2014), Bloom et al.
(2007), Drobetz et al. (2018) and Alfaro et al. (2019)). From this viewpoint, the strength
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of the relation between corporate investment and the cost of capital (i.e., the dependence of
internal financing or its premium over external financing) will be decreasing in uncertainty,
even though firms face a higher cost of capital. This financial aspect of the cautionary effect
because of a firm’s unresponsiveness to financing conditions leads to the prediction that
high uncertainty decreases investment sensitivity to both internal and external financing
variables; put differently, a firm’s financing constraints are indifferent to corporate invest-
ment decisions under high uncertainty because of the dominance of the cautionary effect
over the financing constraint effect.1
Given these two predictions about how changes in uncertainty can amplify corporate
investment by affecting a firm’s financial decisions, this study focuses on two types of cor-
porate investments: capital investment and research and development (R&D). As pointed
out in the empirical and theoretical literature, R&D spending is more affected by a firm’s
financing constraints than capital investment is (Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and
Czarnitzki and Toole (2011)) and uncertainty has a different impact on the dynamics of
capital investment than R&D because of the presence of different adjustment costs (Bloom
(2007)). In this study, focusing on Japanese manufacturing firms making both types of
investments, we uncover the different characteristics of the dynamics in their sensitivity to
financing constraints under high uncertainty.
Our empirics also aim to contribute to the literature on investment–cash flow sensi-
tivity. The study of investment–cash flow sensitivity constitutes one of the largest bodies
of the literature in corporate finance. Some studies have questioned the interpretation of
investment–cash flow sensitivity as a measure of a firm’s constraints on external financing
such as debt and stock issuance.2 However, these empirical studies neither focus on nor
1 Bloom (2007) and Bloom et al. (2007) note this dominance of the cautionary effect on corporate
investment decisions under high uncertainty over the direct effects of changes in economic and financial
conditions, through which firms appear to be less responsive to any given fundamental shock.
2 For example, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) study firms classified as financially constrained by Fazzari
et al. (1998) and find that firms that appear less constrained actually exhibit greater investment–cash
flow sensitivities. More recently, Chen and Chen (2012) also find that investment–cash flow sensitivity
is zero—even during the U.S. credit crunch—and suggest that investment–cash flow sensitivity is a poor
measure of financing constraints. Brown and Petersen (2009) show that investment–cash flow sensitivity
largely disappears for capital investment, but remains comparatively strong for R&D investment, even
though it is declining over time.
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control for the effect of the uncertainty faced by firms. Considering that many studies have
used investment–cash flow sensitivity despite the controversy about the interpretation of
external financing constraints based on the agency problem (see Hoshi et al. (1991), the
references in Hubbard (1998), and, more recently, Moyen (2004), Biddle and Hilary (2006),
Almeida and Campello (2007), Beatty et al. (2010), and Abel (2017)), the implication of
investment–cash flow sensitivity should be reassessed in terms of uncertainty. This study
provides evidence that helps settle the debate, considering the difference between capital
investment and R&D.
In the next section, we briefly review the literature on the relation between uncertainty
and corporate investment. Section 3 discusses our framework for the identification and
uncertainty measures. Section 4 presents our empirical model and method, defines the
variables, describes the data sources, and calculates the summary statistics. Section 5 shows
the estimation results for capital investment and R&D spending. Section 6 concludes.
2. Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Our empirical study builds on a grow-
ing empirical literature documenting that uncertainty countercyclically affects economic
outcomes.3 In particular, uncertainty has been shown to affect long-run economic growth
(Baker and Bloom (2013) and Nakamura et al. (2017)), bank liquidity creation (Berger et
al. (2017)), business cycles (Stock and Watson (2012), Bloom et al. (2016) and Basu and
Bundick (2017)), and equity prices as well as risk premiums (Pa´stor and Veronesi (2012;
2013), and Brogaard and Detzel (2015)).
Complementing this aggregate-level evidence, several studies find that uncertainty af-
fects firm-level outcomes such as capital investment (Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Ogawa and
Suzuki (2000), Bloom et al. (2007), Bloom (2009), Caglayan and Xu (2014), Gulen and
Ion (2016) and Kim and Kung (2017)), R&D investment (Bloom (2007), Bologna (2016)
and Stein and Stone (2019)), firm risk taking (Akey and Lewellen (2017)), equity issuance
(Colak et al. (2016) and Jens et al. (2017)), and the cost of corporate debt (Waisman
et al. (2015)). Overall, both aggregate- and firm-level empirical evidence suggests that
uncertainty has an unfavorable effect on the economy by affecting corporate decisions.
3 See Bloom (2014) for a survey of this literature.
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As discussed in the Introduction, this study contributes to two strands of the literature
examining the effect of uncertainty on corporate investment. The first strand analyzes
how high uncertainty influences investment dynamics within the framework of irreversible
investment (Abel (1983), Bernanke (1983), Abel and Eberly (1994; 1996), Caballero (1999),
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Bloom (2007; 2009) and Bachmann et al. (2013a)). This
approach treats the firm’s future investment opportunities as real options and emphasizes
the importance of the wait-and-see effect. In response to increased uncertainty, firms wait
and see until uncertainty is resolved and the project is more clearly successful or not.4
The second strand is a stream of the macroeconomic literature that has pointed to fi-
nancial market conditions and emphasized the role of agency costs as an additional channel
through which volatility fluctuations can affect investment dynamics. See Bernanke et al.
(1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) for seminal works emphasizing the role of agency
costs in firm investment. The emergent DSGE literature emphasizing the role of uncer-
tainty includes Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Christiano et al. (2014), and Gilchrist
et al. (2014). Based on Merton’s (1974) option pricing insight into the relation between
uncertainty and the value of debt claims, this literature focuses on the financial channel
through which greater downside risk limits a firm’s debt capacity because heightened un-
certainty favors the firm’s shareholders over its bondholders under limited liability, thereby
inducing a decline in the value of debt claims and exacerbating the debt overhang problem
(see also Nakashima and Saito (2009)). By doing so, this approach analyzes the implica-
tions of the interaction between the traditional irreversible investment problem and debt
overhang problem.
While the literature accepts the common view in that uncertainty distorts the level of
corporate investment through the cautionary and financial friction channels, Bloom (2014)
highlights not only this level effect, but also a sensitivity effect that has received little
attention in the extant literature. We empirically test this sensitivity effect by focusing on
the role of a firm’s financing conditions through which fluctuations in uncertainty amplify
4 However, the wait-and-see effect of uncertainty on corporate investment in the presence of irreversibil-
ities is theoretically ambiguous. For example, Abel (1983) and Bloom (2007) demonstrate that the effect
depends on assumptions about the types of capital expenditure, initial accumulation of capital, and market
structure.
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corporate investment dynamics by affecting corporate decisions. More concretely, we exam-
ine whether and how fluctuations in uncertainty increase or decrease the dynamic relation
between a firm’s investment spending and financing conditions.
From the viewpoint of types of corporate investments, several studies point to the no-
ticeable difference between capital investment and R&D in their dynamics.5 Placing cash
flows at the center of the identification strategy for a firm’s financing constraints and financ-
ing distress, empirical analyses of the R&D investment–financing constraints relationship
have demonstrated that this relation is substantially stronger than that with capital invest-
ment (Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Czarnitzki and Toole (2011)), even though it
gradually declines over time (Brown and Petersen (2009)). Moreover, R&D investment–
cash flow sensitivity is more pronounced in younger and smaller firms (Brown et al. (2009;
2012) and Hall et al. (2016)). In the context of the dynamic relation between uncertainty
and corporate investment, uncertainty induces a different impact on the dynamics of cap-
ital investment and R&D because of the different structure of adjustment costs (Bloom
(2007) and Bontempi (2015)). In this study, focusing on Japanese manufacturing firms
making both types of investments, we uncover the different features of the dynamics in
their sensitivity to financing constraints under high uncertainty.
3. Identification of Dynamic Effects and Uncertainly Measures In this section,
we start by considering a framework for identifying the dynamic causal effect of uncer-
tainty on corporate investment through a firm’s financing conditions and then discuss the
uncertainty measures used for the causal identification.
3.1. Identification Framework To identify the dynamic causal effect of uncertainty
on corporate investment through financing conditions, we assume the following dynamic
system based on linear functions g:
Ii,t = g1
(
Ii,t−1, fi,t, fi,t ∗ Ui,t,Others
I
i,t
)
, (1)
fi,t = g2
(
fi,t−1, Ii,t,Ui,t,Others
f
i,t
)
, (2)
5 See Hall and Lerner (2010) for a survey of this literature.
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Ui,t = g3
(
Ui,t−1, Ii,t, fi,t,Others
U
i,t
)
, (3)
where Ii,t is investment spending, including capital investment and R&D, for firm i in
period t. Ui,t denotes a firm-level measure for the uncertainty faced by each firm in period
t.6 ft represents a financial variable for the internal and external financing of corporate
investment such as cash flows and debt issuance. Othersi,t in equations (1)–(3) represents
other factors that can determine a firm’s investment and financing decisions as well as
the level of uncertainty. Investment equation (1) includes an interaction term fit ∗ Ui,t to
capture the effect of uncertainty through a firm’s financing conditions. Equations (1) to
(3) have a linear dynamic structure with one-lagged dependent variables.7
This study identifies the dynamic causal link between the financing variable and cor-
porate investment fi,t → Ii,t+k (k = 0, . . . ,∞) in an uncertain environment Ui,t, using the
interaction effect in investment equation (1). To this end, we need to estimate investment
equation (1) by controlling for the dynamics in fi,t and Ui,t, each represented in equations
(2) and (3).
To control for the dynamics in uncertainty Ui,t expressed in equation (3), we construct
an uncertainty shock Usi,t moving independently of the economic conditions—Ii,t, fi,t and
OthersUi,t—and include this uncertainty shock in equations (1) and (2) as an uncertainty
measure. Preparing for such an uncertainty shock, we set a quasi-natural experiment with
a randomized shock of uncertainty to examine whether and how dynamic investment–
financing sensitivity fi,t → Ii,t+k (k = 0, . . . ,∞) depends on the level of uncertainty in initial
period t, particularly through the interaction effect of the financing variable and uncertainty
shock fit ∗ Usi,t.
Lastly, we run the Blundell–Bond (1998) system generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimation for the dynamic panel investment model (1), preparing for appropriate instru-
ments for the one-period lagged investment Ii,t−1 and the financing variable fi,t to control
for the dynamics of the financial variable in equation (2). In particular, to control for the
6 Instead of firm-level uncertainty Ui,t, we can include macro-level uncertainty Ut by considering the
granular effect (Gabaix (2011)).
7 One can include additional lags of corporate investment Ii,t in investment equation (1). However, we
find that it does not qualitatively change the estimation results for the interaction effect reported in Section
5.
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initial period effect of the uncertainty shock Usi,t on the financial variable in equation (2), we
use this exogenous shock as the most important instrument. We employ the Blundell–Bond
(1998) system GMM estimation as more persistent R&D spending, or a certain near ran-
dom walk in it (see Section 5.2), could lead to substantial bias in the estimated coefficients
when employing the Arellano–Bond (1991) GMM estimation. The Blundell–Bond (1998)
system GMM estimation can ease this problem, even though it may still provide mixed re-
sults (see Blundell and Bond (1998)). Section 4 presents our specification of the investment
model and instruments. In addition, we conduct the weak instrumental robust inference
based on the Kleibergen (2005) testing procedure to complement our causal analysis (see
Section 5.4).
3.2. Uncertainty Shocks As discussed above, a measure of exogenous uncertainty is
necessary to identify the dynamic effect of uncertainty on corporate investment through a
firm’s financing conditions. In this subsection, we discuss such an uncertainty measure.8
3.2.1. Firm- and Macro-Level Uncertainty In this study, we focus on both firm-level
and macro-level uncertainty. For firm-level uncertainty, we exploit information about the
volatility of the daily excess equity returns of each firm. Equity volatility is calculated in
the annualized standard deviation of daily excess returns, according to
σEi,t =
√√√√√ 1
D(t)− 1
D(t)∑
d(t)=1
(
ERi,d(t) −ERt
)2
×
√
D(t), (4)
where i indexes firms and d(t) (d(t) = 1, · · · , D(t)) indexes trading days in firm i’s fiscal
year t. In equation (4), ERi,d(t) denotes the daily excess return of firm i defined as ERi,d(t) =
Ri,d(t) − r
f
d(t), where r
f
d(t) is the risk-free rate. For the risk-free rate, we use the daily return
of newly issued 10-year Japanese government bonds.
As for macro-level uncertainty, we focus on the volatility index Japan (VIXJ) and
8 Previous studies have employed various types of measures to infer fluctuations in uncertainty, including
uncertainty measures based on the frequency of the uncertainty-related words or phrases that occur across
a number of news sources (Baker et al. (2016)), the cross-sectional dispersion of survey-based business
forecasts (Bachmann et al. (2013b)), and the common factor of the unforecastable component of a number
of economic indicators (Jurado et al. (2013)).
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economic policy uncertainty index for Japan (EPUJ). The VIXJ is provided by the Center
of the Study of Finance and Insurance and is in strict accordance with the Chicago Board
Options Exchange approach underlying the VIX. The EPUJ is the time-varying news-based
index of Japanese economic policy uncertainty developed by Arbatli et al. (2017) and it is
based on the frequency of articles in a country’s major newspapers that focus on uncertainty
about future economic policy, as proposed by Baker et al. (2016). We convert monthly
data on the VIXJ and EPUJ into quarterly data by taking the average to estimate the
uncertainty shocks, as we discuss in the next subsection. The uncertainty measures are
calculated by taking the average for the fiscal year.
Figure 1 shows the firm- and macro-level uncertainty measures. For firm-level uncer-
tainty, its sample average in each fiscal year is reported.
However, these uncertainty measures reflect the endogenously countercyclical effects of
the economic and financing conditions faced by firms (see equation (3)); hence, their di-
rect use leads to an erroneous evaluation of the causal effect of uncertainty on corporate
investment. Therefore, we need to construct purely exogenous uncertainties moving inde-
pendently of the economic and financing conditions. In the next subsection, we construct
the uncertainty shocks.
3.2.2. Exogenous Uncertainty Measures Our estimate of exogenous firm-level uncer-
tainty is based on the following three-step procedure suggested by Gilchrist et al. (2014).
First, we remove the endogenous variation relating to the systematic risk in daily excess
returns using the factor model:
ERi,d(t) = αi + β
′
i
fd(t) + ui,d(t), (5)
where ERi,d(t) denotes the daily excess return of firm i and fd(t) is a vector of the risk
factors. To implement this first step, we employ the Fama and French (1992) three-factor
model. For the three factors (i.e., the market, SMB, and HML factors), we use Kubota
and Takehara’s Fama–French data, compiled by Financial Data Solutions Inc.9
9 In this compiled data for the three factors, the daily return of newly issued 10-year Japanese government
bonds is used to calculate the market factor.
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In the second step, we calculate the annualized firm-specific volatility of daily idiosyn-
cratic excess returns:
σi,t =
√√√√√ 1
D(t)− 1
D(t)∑
d(t)=1
(
hatui,d(t) − ut
)2
×
√
D(t), (6)
where uˆi,d(t) denotes the OLS residual—the exogenous idiosyncratic return moving inde-
pendently of the macro-level risk factors—from equation (5) and ut is the sample mean of
the exogenous return in a firm’s fiscal year t.
Lastly, we assume that firm-specific idiosyncratic volatility follows the following autore-
gressive process:10
lnσi,t = γi + δit+ ρ ln σi,t−1 +U
s
i,t, (7)
where Usi,t denotes the idiosyncratic volatility shock. γi denotes the firm fixed effect used to
control for the cross-sectional heterogeneity in σi,t, while the firm-specific term δit captures
the trends in idiosyncratic risk. To obtain the idiosyncratic volatility shock, we run the
OLS estimation for the sample period from fiscal years 1978 to 2014.11
Our estimate of exogenous macro-level uncertainty is based on the structural vector
autoregression (VAR) to identify an uncertainty shock as an exogenous movement in the
VIXJ and EPUJ. Following Basu and Bundick (2017), we estimate a VAR with the follow-
ing eight variables: one of the two uncertainty measures, gross domestic product (GDP),
consumption, investment, a GDP deflater, stock price (Nikkei 225 index), and two measures
of the monetary policy stance: the monetary base and short-term policy rate (overnight
call rate). Since VIXJ and EPUJ data start in 1998 and 1988, respectively, we estimate
the VAR using quarterly data over the 1998 and 2015 sample periods. With the exception
of the uncertainty measures and short-term policy rate, all the other variables enter the
VAR in log levels.
10 The double-log specification of σi,t reflects the fact that the firm-level idiosyncratic volatility of excess
returns is highly positively skewed, a non-linear feature in which volatility has higher autocorrelation in a
period of higher volatility.
11 Following Gilchrist et al. (2014), we employ the OLS estimation because the average firm is in the
long-term panel for more than 35 years, and hence the bias of the OLS estimator because of a lagged
dependent variable and firm fixed effects is likely to be negligible (Phillips and Sul (2007)). The estimation
yields ρ = 0.379, indicating that idiosyncratic uncertainty does not tend to be long-lastingly persistent.
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We identify an uncertainty shock using a Cholesky decomposition with the macro-level
uncertainty measure ordered last. This ordering allows us to extract an uncertainty shock
by controlling for simultaneous endogeneity, assuming that the uncertainty shock does not
have an immediate impact on the seven macroeconomic variables ordered above the uncer-
tainty measure, whereas non-uncertainty shocks can simultaneously affect the uncertainty
measure.12 See Appendix I for the estimated impulse responses to an uncertainty shock
in the eight-variable VAR.
Figure 2 shows the three types of estimated exogenous uncertainties. For firm-level
exogenous uncertainty, its sample average in each fiscal year is reported.
We use the exogenous uncertainty measures to examine the dynamic effect of uncertainty
on corporate investment, particularly focusing on the role of a firm’s financing conditions.
4. Empirical Specification and Data In this section, we introduce an empirical
specification to examine the role of internal and external financing in corporate investment
by firms facing high uncertainty and then discuss the estimation method and our dataset.
4.1. Measuring the Dynamic Effects of Uncertainty on Corporate Investment
We start by discussing how to measure the dynamic effect of internal and external financing
on corporate investment in association with the extent of uncertainty. To this end, along
with the framework for identification developed in Section 3.1, we introduce a dynamic
investment equation in the following general setting:
Ii,t = a0Ii,t−1 + a0uIi,t−1U
s
i,t−1 +
m∑
k=0
(
bkfi,t−k + bkufi,t−kU
s
i,t−k
)
+
m∑
k=0
ckuU
s
i,t−k
+d0yi,t + vt ∗ INDi + ai + ǫi,t, (8)
where yt denotes a variable that controls for the demand conditions for corporate investment
such as Tobin’s Q (Hoshi and Kashyap (1990), Hayashi and Inoue (1991) and Hennessy et
al. (2007)). vt ∗ INDi is the interaction term of the year dummies and industry dummies
12 Unlike us, Basu and Bundick (2017) order their uncertainty measures first in their VAR. Even if we
order the VIXJ and EPUJ first and then use the identified uncertainty shocks in our analysis developed
below, it results in qualitatively the same results as those reported in Section 5.
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that controls for the time-varying industry effects. ai is a firm fixed effect that controls for
the time-invariant unobservable determinants of firm investment at the firm level. εi,t is a
stochastic error term.
As discussed above, Bloom (2014) argues that uncertainty affects not only the level of
investment, but also the sensitivity of corporate investment to factors that drive investment
spending. Regarding the former prediction about the effect of uncertainty, the coefficient
parameters cku capture it as the direct level effect. We focus more on the latter prediction
for a particular important relation: the sensitivity of corporate investment to (i) lagged
uncertainty shocks and (ii) the internal and external financing variables. In our empirical
analysis, the interaction effects a0u and bku are crucial.
The corporate investment problem is subject to partial irreversibility and fixed adjust-
ment costs (Abel (1983), Bernanke (1983), Abel and Eberly (1994; 1996), Caballero (1999),
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Bloom (2007; 2009) and Bachmann et al. (2013a)). These
factors create the option value of waiting, meaning that investment expenditure is more
likely to be lumpy if it exists. In response to the increase in uncertainty, the region of
investment inaction expands; consequently, high uncertainty prevents firms from launching
a new investment project and/or maintaining the previous level of lagged investment ex-
penditure, and thus corporate investment and its persistency decrease. Such current and
lagged cautionary effects because of increasing uncertainty are encapsulated by the negative
estimates of the level effect c0u and sensitivity effect a0u, respectively.
The interaction effect bku captures how the increase in uncertainty changes the user cost
of capital and investment sensitivity to internal and external financing. Recent macroeco-
nomic studies based on DSGE models have pointed out the importance of financial frictions
and agency costs as an additional channel through which volatility fluctuations adversely af-
fect macroeconomic outcomes (Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Christiano et al. (2014),
and Gilchrist et al. (2014)). According to this literature, to the extent that external financ-
ing is subject to agency problems, increasing uncertainty raises the user cost of capital in
decreasing the market value of debt claims and then increases the dependence of internal
financing such as cash flows and cash reserves. Such an effect of high uncertainty through fi-
nancial market frictions and a firm’s financing constraints is evaluated in terms of whether
12
the interaction effect bku contributes to increasing investment sensitivity, particularly to
internal financing.
In contrast to the theoretical prediction of a positive relation between high uncertainty
and investment sensitivity to internal financing, Bloom (2007; 2014), Bloom et al. (2007),
and Alfaro et al. (2019) note that uncertainty makes managers less sensitive to changes
in fundamental economic and financing conditions such as the cost of capital. According
to this notion, the strength of the relation between corporate investment and the cost of
capital (i.e., the dependence on internal financing) will be decreasing in uncertainty (see
also Drobetz et al. (2018)). The financial aspect of the cautionary effect because of a firm’s
unresponsiveness to financing conditions and the dominance of this cautionary effect over
the above financing constraint effect is assessed in terms of whether the interaction effect
bku contributes to decreasing investment sensitivity to both internal and external financing
under high uncertainty.
In the dynamic investment equation (8), the response of corporate investment l period
after a change in the financial variable in period t is expressed as in the following marginal
effect in period t+ l (l ≥ m ≥ 0):
MEl,ft(U
s
i,t) =
∂Ii,t+l
∂fi,t
=
(
a0 + a0uU
s
i,t
)
MEl−1,ft(U
s
i,t)
=
∑
l≥m
(
a0 + a0uU
s
i,t
)l (
bm + bmuU
s
i,t
)
. (9)
The cumulative effect through period t+ l is defined as QME0,l,ft(U
s
i,t) =
∑l
j=0 MEj,ft(U
s
i,t),
and then the long-run effect for l→∞ reduces to
QME0,∞,ft(U
s
i,t) =
∑m
k=0
(
bk + bkuU
s
i,t
)
1− a0 − a0uUsi,t
. (10)
Equations (9) and (10) show that the marginal and long-run effects depend on the lagged
cautionary effect a0u and financial interaction effect bku as well as the level of uncertainty
in the initial period t. Importantly, if the lagged cautionary effect has a negative value,
this implies that high uncertainty reduces the dynamic response of corporate investment
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to a change in the financing variables and promotes a firm’s unresponsiveness to financ-
ing conditions. If the financial interaction term has a positive (negative) value, it means
that the high uncertainty increases (decreases) the dynamic causal link between corporate
investment and financing conditions. To examine whether internal and external financing
constraints amplify the dynamic effect on corporate investment under high uncertainty, we
use the marginal and long-run effects by focusing on both the lagged cautionary effect and
the financial interaction effect in our analysis below.
4.2. Specification for Corporate Investment and Estimation Method We run
the empirical implementation of investment model (8) in the following specification:
Ii,t = a0Ii,t−1 + a0uIi,t−1Ui,t−1 +
m∑
k=0
(
bkcCFi,t−k + b
k
dDEBTi,t−k + b
k
sSIi,t−k
)
+
m∑
k=0
(
bkcuCFi,t−k + b
k
duDEBTi,t−k + b
k
suSIi,t−k
)
∗ Usi,t−k +
m∑
k=0
ckuU
s
i,t−k
+dqQi,t + dlSALESi,t−1 + vt ∗ INDi + ai + ǫi,t, (11)
where CFi,t represents the firm’s cash flows as a measure of the use of internal financing
(Fazzari et al. (1988) and Moyen (2004)). DEBTi,t and SIi,t respectively denote the ratio
of the firm’s debt issues and stock issues to total assets, which are included as measures
of the use of external financing (Chen and Chen (2012), Brown and Peterson (2009) and
Brown et al. (2009; 2012)). Qi,t and SALESi,t− denote Tobin’s Q and the one-lagged value
of the sales to total assets ratio that controls for the firm’s investment demand.13
In firm investment equation (11), we additionally include the interaction terms of the
uncertainty indicator with the firm’s alternative finance sources—cash flows, debt issues,
and stock issues—as well as the interaction term of the uncertainty indicator with the
one-period lagged dependent variable. We identify a dynamic relationship between high
13 The canonical dynamic investment model reduces to an empirical specification for investment that
includes the simultaneous value of Tobin’s Q as an explanatory variable if its role is investigated (e.g.,
Hayashi and Inoue (1991)). By contrast, it reduces to a model that includes the one-lagged value of the
sales to total assets ratio if its role is focused on (e.g., Bond and Meghir (1994)). Considering this point,
we include the simultaneous value of Tobin’s Q and the one-lagged value of the sales to total assets ratio
in our investment equation, as in Brown et al. (2012).
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uncertainty and investment sensitivity to internal and external financing using the finan-
cial interaction effects bk and compare their economic significance with that of the direct
cautionary effect a0u, thereby examining how high uncertainty affects investment spending
by financially constrained firms.
As discussed in Section 3.1, to estimate the above dynamic panel model with a lagged
dependent variable Ii,t−1 , we employ the Blundell–Bond (1998) system GMM estimation,
which allows us to address the potential endogeneity among all the financial variables and
interaction terms by estimating firm investment equation (11) in differences and in levels,
using lagged levels of the instruments for the regression in differences and lagged differences
of the instruments for the regression in levels.
4.3. Selecting the Lag Length Before performing a full-fledged analysis of the dy-
namic effect of uncertainty on corporate investment, we must select lag length m in in-
vestment equation (11). To this end, we employ the modified BIC, AIC, and HQIC model
selection criteria developed based on Andrews and Lu’s (2001) consistent model and mo-
ment selection criteria (MMSC) for the GMM estimation: the MMSC-BIC, MMSC-AIC,
and MMSC-HQIC (see Appendix II for a detailed definition). In the models using the firm-
level uncertainty shock (FIRM), all three MMSC criteria select a zero lag for both capital
investment and R&D in a robust manner. As for the two models using the macro-level
uncertainty shock, the MMSC-BIC and MMSC-HQIC seem to select a zero lag for both
capital investment and R&D, while the MMSC-AIC does not select a particular lag and
produces mixed results. As is well known, the BIC and HQIC are more likely to select a
shorter lag inherently, whereas the AIC selects a longer lag, although it does not yield a
robust result in our empirics. Given this, we adopt the zero lag specification for the firm’s
capital investment and R&D spending. See Appendix II for the details of the results.
4.4. Dataset Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for each variable. We obtain all
the data from the published annual accounts (consolidated base) of manufacturing firms,
compiled by Nikkei Digital Media Inc, for our sample period of fiscal years 2001 to 2014.
We select manufacturing firms making both capital and R&D investments to compare
the dynamics of capital investment and R&D under high uncertainty. For the investment
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spending (Ii,t) included in equation (11), we use the firm’s fixed investment or R&D, each
defined by dividing the original variables by its total assets, where the fixed investment is
defined as the net change in fixed assets plus depreciation.
As for the uncertainty variable (Ui,t), we alternately use the exogenous components of
the firm-level volatility index σi,t as well as the macro-level uncertainty measures: the VIXJ
and EPUJ (see Section 3.2).
As shown in equation (11), we consider three alternative financing sources: cash flows,
debt financing, and stock issues. We define cash flows (CFi,t) as the ratio of current net
income plus depreciation and amortization to its total assets. For the debt financing of
firm i (DEBTi,t), we include the ratio of annual changes in total debt outstanding to its
total asset holding. As for the firm’s stock issues (STi,t), we use the amount of stock issues,
which is defined as an increase in capital stock when a firm raises both outstanding shares
and capital stock, normalized by its total assets.
Tobin’s Q (Qi,t) is the ratio of the market value of firm i to its book value, where the
market value of the firm is the market value of its equity plus the book value of its total
liabilities.14 Sales (SALESi,t) is defined as the ratio of the firm’s gross sales to its total
assets. We include the two firm covariates to control for the firm’s investment demand.
The industry dummy variables are set according to the 17 industry sectors defined by the
Securities Identification Code Committee in Japan.
5. Estimation Results In this section, we report the estimation results for corporate
investment equation (11), particularly focusing on the effect of uncertainty on the sensitivity
of corporate investment spending to internal and external financing. By doing so, we
examine how firms finance capital investment and R&D under high uncertainty and then
analyze the differences that exist between these two types of investment spending.
5.1. Uncertainty and Capital Investment Table 2 reports the estimation results
for capital investment spending. The left, middle, and right panels of this table show the
results obtained using the firm-level volatility shock (FIRM), macro-level volatility shock
14 We calculate the market value of equity by multiplying the end-of-year stock price by the number of
shares.
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based on the VIXJ, and economic policy uncertainty shock based on the EPUJ (see Section
3.2), respectively. The columns in each panel report the zero- or one-lag models with or
without the interaction terms with the uncertainty shocks. Here, we emphasize the zero-
lag model since the information criteria select a zero lag for most specifications of capital
investment spending, as discussed in Section 4.2. To ensure that the results do not rely on
the lag length, we show the estimation results of the one-lag model including the firm-level
volatility shock as an uncertainty shock.
The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable of capital investment a0 are signif-
icantly estimated to be around 0.16 to 0.18, indicating that the shortage of internal and
external financing sources has a short-lasting effect on capital investment. More impor-
tantly, the lagged cautionary effect a0u has significantly negative values aside from the
EPUJ, which implies that high uncertainty reduces the persistence of capital investment
and that capital investment becomes more lumpy because firms are reluctant to maintain
the previous level of capital investment under high uncertainty.
Internal financing sources bk appear to have significantly positive estimates for cash
flows in a statistically robust manner. As for external financing sources, debt issuances
have positive estimates. This finding implies that as long as uncertainty is lower, firms are
more likely to increase capital investment by raising cash flows and/or issuing debt.
The financial interaction effects with the three financing variables bku in the models
using the firm-level uncertainty shock appear to have significantly negative estimates for
cash flows. The interaction effects with external financing sources also have a negative sign,
although they are not statistically significant. This finding implies that high uncertainty
reduces the sensitivity of capital investment to cash flows because of the cautionary channel
(Bloom (2007), Bloom et al. (2007) and Alfaro et al. (2019)), through which a firm’s
unresponsiveness to financing conditions is more pronounced under high uncertainty.
Such a cautionary channel can be observed in terms of the dynamic response of capital
investment. Figure 3 reports the estimated dynamic responses of capital investment to a
1% change in the three financing variables at low and high levels of firm-level uncertainty
obtained using the zero-lag model. Apparently, high uncertainty amplifies the dynamic
response of capital investment to a shock to cash flows to a lesser degree.
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Under low uncertainty, the dynamic response to cash flows has a significantly positive
value for a longer period than under high uncertainty. This finding implies that at low
uncertainty, firms finance capital investment using cash flows; however, under high un-
certainty, the cautionary effect weakens this causal link between capital investment and
internal financing. The previous literature points out that high uncertainty raises the cost
of capital and worsens financing conditions (Merton (1974), Bernanke and Gilchrist (1996),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Christiano et al. (2014)
and Gilchrist et al. (2014)); however, firms respond less to such deteriorated financing
conditions under the cautionary strategy when making capital investment decisions under
high uncertainty (Bloom (2007; 2014), Bloom et al. (2007), Drobetz et al. (2018) and
Alfaro et al. (2019)).
The dynamic response to debt issues has a significantly positive value under low un-
certainty, whereas the response under high uncertainty is not statistically significant. High
uncertainty lessens the sensitivity of not only cash flows but also debt insurance on cap-
ital investment, and thus we show that the sensitivity of financing to capital investment
weakens under uncertainty because of the cautionary effect of uncertainty.
Further, the investment equations that do not control for the interaction effects with
uncertainty shocks have significantly negative estimates for their level effect c0u, or the
simultaneous cautionary effect, indicating that increasing uncertainty directly and simulta-
neously decreases capital investment. However, once the investment equations also control
for the sensitivity effects with uncertainty a0u and bku, such a level effect vanishes. Given
these results, the sensitivity effect through the investment latency structure and the firm’s
financing conditions would have a more substantive role in capital investment than the
direct level effect.
5.2. Uncertainty and R&D Next, we report the estimation results for R&D. Table 3
reports the zero-lag models with or without the interaction terms with uncertainty and the
one-lag model with the interaction terms. We again focus on the zero-lag model because the
information criteria selected a zero lag for most of the specifications of R&D investment,
as discussed in Section 4.3.
The most noticeable difference between R&D and capital investment is that the esti-
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mated coefficients on the lagged dependent variable of R&D a0 are much higher than those
on the lagged dependent variable of capital investment, being close to one. This finding
implies that compared with capital investment, R&D has a more persistent feature and
fairly near random work behavior; put differently, a one-time shock to R&D has a perma-
nent effect without it disappearing intertemporally. Moreover, the lagged cautionary effect
a0u in R&D has a not statistically significant and lower negative value than that in capital
investment does, which indicates that even if firms face fluctuations in uncertainty, they
are more likely to maintain the level of R&D and engage in R&D smoothing (Brown et al.
(2009; 2012) and Hall et al. (2016)).
Considering that the estimated coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are close
to one, we test whether they are statistically indistinguishable from one, a0 = 1. If the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is close to one, the weak instrument problem
can emerge—even when employing the Blundell–Bond (1998) system GMM estimation (see
Section 3.1). As shown in the bottom row of Table 3, the hypothesis a0 = 1 is rejected
in a statistically significant manner in the zero-lag model, whereas the hypothesis in the
one-lag model is not rejected. Since the tests for lag selection support the zero-lag model,
the concern on a0 = 1 is inconsiderable; nonetheless, to ensure the validity of our results,
we also estimate the R&D equation with the restriction a0 = 1 using the same instruments.
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the models using the difference in R&D (∆R&D)
as the dependent variable, showing qualitatively the same results as in Table 3.
Tables 3 and 4 also share the quality of the estimation results for the financing variables
bk and their interaction effects with uncertainty bku in that the interaction effect with inter-
nal financing sources in R&D investment is much weaker than that in capital investment in
terms not only of magnitude, but also of quality: only cash flows have significantly positive
estimates in a qualitatively robust manner.
Figure 4 shows the estimated dynamic responses of R&D to a 1% change in the three
financing variables at low and high levels of firm-level uncertainty obtained using the zero-
lag model of Table 3. Except for R&D–cash flow sensitivity, sensitivity to debt as well
as stock issuances is not significant. From the dynamics in R&D–cash flow sensitivity, we
observe that under low uncertainty, R&D is much more persistently affected following a
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financial shock to cash flows than capital investment is, although the estimated impact on
R&D is much smaller than that on capital investment. However, most importantly, as in
capital investment, high uncertainty also weakens the causal link between R&D and cash
flows. That is, although R&D is longer-lasting than capital investment, but less negatively
affected by the shortage of cash flows (i.e., external funding constraints) under high un-
certainty, these two types of corporate investments share evidence that high uncertainty
amplifies the dynamic response to a shock to the internal financing source because of the
cautionary effect to a lesser extent.
5.3. Uncertainty and the Long-run Effect Table 5 shows the long-run effect of a
financing shock on corporate investment and R&D using the firm-level uncertainty shock
(see equation (10) in Section 4.1 for the long-run effect). As shown in panel (a) for cap-
ital investment, the long-run effect of an internal financing shock to cash flows is much
smaller under high uncertainty than under low uncertainty, indicating that as uncertainty
increases, the importance of internal financing (i.e., financing constraints) becomes smaller
in making capital investment decisions. Furthermore, a debt issuance shock has less effect
on capital investment under high uncertainty, although the difference between low and high
uncertainty is slightly smaller than that for internal financing. Further, a stock issuance
shock does not yield significant long-run effects under low or high uncertainty.
Compared with capital investment, the long-run effect of each financing shock shown
in panel (b) for R&D investment is very weak in terms of its significance; however, the
magnitude of the long-run effect to a cash flow shock for R&D spending is larger than
that for capital investment spending under both low and high uncertainty. In the previous
subsection, we found that under low uncertainty, R&D is much more persistently affected
following a cash flow shock than capital investment is, although the temporal impact on
R&D is much smaller than that on capital investment. Given this finding, the larger long-
run effect of a financial shock to cash flows on R&D could be attributed to its inherent
long-lasting persistency. Nonetheless, given that the point estimates of the long-run effect
of a cash flow shock on R&D appear to be much smaller under high uncertainty than under
low uncertainty, R&D also shares with capital investment evidence that as uncertainty
increases, the importance of internal financing (i.e., a firm’s financing constraints) becomes
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smaller when making both types of corporate investments because of the cautionary effect.
Summing up our dynamic analysis, a financial shock to internal financing sources (i.e.,
cash flows) has a more short-lasting, but larger impact on capital investment, whereas it
has a longer-lasting, but smaller temporal impact on R&D. However, this internal financing
shock has a larger long-run impact on R&D investment because of its inherent long-lasting
persistency based on the higher adjustment costs of the intangibles accumulated through
R&D investment, as pointed out by Williamson (1988) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2002).
5.4. Weak Instrument Robust Inference for the Cautionary Effect The plausi-
bility of our empirical results presented thus far relies on the assumption that our instru-
ments in the system GMM estimation are relevant to the three financing variables and their
interaction terms with the uncertainty shocks. However, unacknowledged weak instruments
could provide us with a spurious finding because no standard test for weak instruments in
dynamic panel GMM regressions exists (see Bazzi and Clemens (2013)). To address this
potential problem, we employ the Kleibergen (2005) testing procedure to conduct the weak
instrument robust inference. The Kleibergen procedure has better power properties than
the conventional Anderson and Rubin procedure in many instruments. This procedure
thus allows us to generate joint confidence sets for the case of multiple endogenous vari-
ables based on the null hypothesis that a coefficient parameter on an endogenous variable
takes the true value and the instruments are valid (Kleibergen (2005) refers this test as
the J-K test); therefore, the confidence set derived using the J-K test is robust not only to
weak instruments, but also to invalid instruments.
When employing the Kleibergen procedure, we conduct the weak instrument robust
inference for two estimated coefficients on cash flows and its interaction term with the
firm-level uncertainty shock. This is because the two coefficients mainly involve our finding
that high uncertainty reduces the sensitivity of capital investment and R&D to this internal
financing source because of the cautionary channel. Figure 5 shows the joint confidence
sets for the two estimated coefficients in the models of capital investment (panel (a)) and
R&D (panel (b)), both of which are based on the non-lagged models in equation (11) (see
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Section 4.3 for the lag selection).15 WALD and J-K denote the 90% joint confidence sets
derived using the conventional Wald test and J-K test, respectively.
Regarding capital investment, the joint confidence set of the estimated coefficients on
cash flow (horizontal line) and its interaction term with the firm-level uncertainty shock
(vertical line) appears not to depend on the Wald and J-K tests. The interaction effect be-
tween cash flow and uncertainty falls into a negative region, even in the J-K test, indicating
that the finding that high uncertainty decreases capital investment–cash flow sensitivity is
robust not only to weak instruments, but also to invalid instruments.
As for R&D investment, the joint confidence set derived using the J-K test appears to be
different from that derived using the Wald test; more concretely, the J-K 90% confidence
interval of the interaction effect between cash flow and uncertainty takes a significantly
larger negative region than the Wald one. This finding indicates that only the system GMM
regression would lead to the underestimation of the interaction effect with uncertainty,
unless the weak instrument robust inference is not conducted.
Our weak instrument robust inference based on the Kleibergen (2005) procedure strongly
suggests that our key result—high uncertainty reduces the cash flow sensitivity of capital
investment and R&D—holds in a statistically robust manner, even if our instruments are
weak and invalid.
5.5. Cash Holdings and Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity Some previous lit-
erature has focused on the role of firms’ cash holdings as their precautionary motive for
financing future corporate investment (Almeida et al. (2014)). Here, we address the issue
of whether or how investment–cash flow sensitivity depends on firms’ cash holdings under
uncertainty. To this end, we define cash-rich firms as an indicator variable of firms with
higher cash holdings. Then, we include the interaction term of cash flows (CFi,t) and the
indicator of cash-rich firms as well as the triple interaction term of cash flows, the uncer-
tainty variable (Ui,t), and the indicator of cash-rich firms into capital investment equation
(11).
Table 6 shows the estimation results for capital investment equation (11) including the
15 We confirm that the one-lag models for capital and R&D investment produce the qualitatively same
results reported below.
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two interaction terms. In this table, we define two types of indicators of cash-rich firms in
the top 50th and 70th percentiles of cash holdings to total assets. The interaction terms
of cash flows (CFi,t) and indicator of cash-rich firms appear to have significantly negative
coefficients, implying that investment–cash flow sensitivity decreases (increases) for cash-
rich (cash-poor) firms. The triple interaction terms appear to cancel the interaction effect
of cash flows and the uncertainty variable: in other words, cash-rich firms do not suffer
from the cautionary effect caused by uncertainty shocks.
We can observe these estimation results more clearly in Figure 6, which shows the
dynamic response of capital investment to a one-unit change in cash flows for cash-rich
(upper panels) and cash-poor firms (lower panels) under low (left panels) and high uncer-
tainty (right panels) for firms in the top 50th percentiles of cash holdings. This figure shows
that investment–cash flow sensitivity for cash-rich firms diminishes in the cases of both low
and high uncertainty. However, investment–cash flow sensitivity for cash-poor firms still
remains high and low under low and high uncertainty, respectively. Our results thus far
indicate that the cautionary effect would emerge for firms with less cash holdings—even
though this effect becomes more substantial under high uncertainty—-but not for firms
with more cash holdings.
5.6. Shortage of Internal Financing and Corporate Investment Under High
Uncertainty The above analysis provides an important insight into the causal link be-
tween the shortage of internal financing and corporate investment under high uncertainty.
The shortage of internal financing under high uncertainty has different effects on capital
investment and R&D in terms of persistency, but the same effects in terms of quality. If
firms lack sufficient access to internal financing—cash flows and cash holdings—under high
uncertainty, such a liquidity shortage has a negative effect on both capital investment and
R&D; however, this liquidity shortage is longer-lasting for R&D than for capital investment.
Although the persistence of the liquidity shortage effect under high uncertainty is dif-
ferent between capital investment and R&D, the two types of investments share the effect
of uncertainty through which investment sensitivity to internal financing sources (i.e., the
firm’s external financing constraints) decreases in uncertainty because of cautionary behav-
ior. Such a financial aspect of the cautionary effect is particularly remarkable in capital
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investment in terms of its magnitude, making the firm’s financing conditions indifferent
to their investment decisions and thus reducing the level of capital investment over time
because of the directly negative effect of uncertainty.
Given that R&D investment inherently has a high degree of intertemporal inertia be-
cause of higher adjustment costs (Williamson (1988) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2002)), it
is reasonable that for R&D investment, not only the directly negative effect of uncertainty,
but also the firm’s unresponsiveness to financing conditions because of cautionary behavior
is much weaker even under high uncertainty than for capital investment; however, once
firms face a shortage of internal financing, such a shortage has a larger long-run impact on
R&D because of its inherent intertemporal inertia.
Nonetheless, irrespective of those differences, most importantly, capital investment and
R&D share the cautionary effect through which the firm’s internal and external financing
conditions become indifferent to actual corporate investment decisions under high uncer-
tainty.
6. Conclusion High uncertainty has two channels through which the relation between
corporate investment and financing conditions is affected. The first channel involves financ-
ing constraints: firms with a higher cost of capital depend more on internal financing and
their investment sensitivity to internal financing increases. The second channel is based on
a financial aspect of cautionary behavior through which the strength of investment–internal
financing sensitivity is decreasing in uncertainty because of the firm’s unresponsiveness to
the financing conditions.
Using firm-level data on the Japanese manufacturing industry from fiscal years 2001 to
2014, this study identifies the causal effect of uncertainty on the dynamic relation between
corporate investment and financing conditions, thus demonstrating that the cautionary
effect is increasingly dominant under high uncertainty irrespective of the type of corporate
investment: capital investment and R&D. The dominance of the cautionary effect over
the financing constraint effect makes the firm’s financing conditions under high uncertainty
indifferent to actual corporate investment decisions, thereby reducing corporate investment
gradually over time.
To establish this main finding, we first demonstrated that under high uncertainty, capital
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investment and R&D are differently affected by a shortage of internal financing in terms of
magnitude and persistency; however, they share the cautionary effect in terms of quality.
In terms of magnitude and persistency, the more severe availability of internal financing—
cash flows and cash holdings—has a more short-lasting, but a temporarily larger impact on
capital investment, whereas it has a longer-lasting, but temporarily smaller impact on R&D.
These severe internal financing constraints under high uncertainty result in a larger long-
run impact on R&D because of its inherent long-lasting persistency based on the higher
adjustment costs of the intangibles accumulated through R&D investment (Williamson
(1988) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2002)).
Nonetheless, irrespective of those differences, most importantly, we found that capital
investment and R&D share the cautionary effect through which the firm’s internal and
external financing conditions become indifferent to actual corporate investment decisions
under high uncertainty. We established this evidence in a statistically rigorous manner in
terms of dynamic causal inference, not only by first setting up a quasi-natural experiment
with a randomized shock of uncertainty and next employing the instrumental variable esti-
mation approach, but also by accounting for the weakness and validity of our instruments.
Effective policy options for stagnant corporate investment heavily depend on whether it
is because of an increase in financial frictions or firms’ cautionary strategy. Our evidence
suggests that policies aimed at easing firms’ financing constraints cannot work without
lowering the uncertainty they face.
Appendix I: Impulse Responses to an Uncertainty Shock We estimate a struc-
tural VAR to identify an uncertainty shock as a purely exogenous movement in the two
uncertainty indicators: the VIXJ and EPUJ. Following Basu and Bundick (2017), we es-
timate a VAR with the following eight variables: one of the uncertainty indicators, GDP,
consumption, investment, a GDP deflater, stock price (Nikkei 225 index), and two indica-
tors of the monetary policy stance: the monetary base and short-term policy rate (overnight
call rate). Since the VIXJ and EPUJ data start in 1998 and 1988, respectively, we estimate
the VAR using quarterly data over the 1998 and 2015 sample periods. With the exception
of the uncertainty indicators and short-term policy rate, all the other variables enter the
VAR in log levels. We identify an uncertainty shock using a Cholesky decomposition with
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the VIXJ and EPUJ ordered last.
Here, we only report the estimated impulse responses to an identified uncertainty shock
of the VIXJ because the two uncertainty shocks of the VIXJ and EPUJ produce quali-
tatively similar impulse responses. Figure A plots the estimated impulse responses to a
one-standard-deviation uncertainty shock along with the 90% confidence intervals. The
one-standard-deviation shock increases the VIXJ by 3%. Following the shock, output,
consumption, investment, and stock prices all decline together, with their peak responses
occurring after about one year. The peak decline in investment is roughly five times as
large as the decline in output and consumption. Prices begin to decrease about two year
after the uncertainty shock hits and then continue to fall. The declines in economic ac-
tivity and inflation lead the monetary authority to reduce its nominal interest rate and
increase the monetary base, although such a response is not immediate and statistically
indistinguishable from zero, particularly for the monetary base. The above results are
qualitatively similar to the findings of previous studies of the economy’s response to an
uncertainty shock, including Christiano et al. (2014), Gilchrist et al. (2014), Jurado et al.
(2015), and Basu and Bundick (2017).
Appendix II: Lag Selection in the Dynamic Investment Model To select the lag
length in dynamic investment model (1), we employ Andrews and Lu’s (2001) consistent
MMSC for the GMM estimation. They define the conventional BIC, AIC, and HQIC model
selection criteria in the framework of the MMSC as follows:
MMSC-BICn(b, c) = Jn(b, c)− (|c| − |b|) lnn, (A-1)
MMSC-AICn(b, c) = Jn(b, c)− 2(|c| − |b|), (A-2)
MMSC-HQICn(b, c) = Jn(b, c)−Q(|c| − |b|) ln lnn, (A-3)
where n is the number of observations and |b| and |c| denote the number of parameters b
and moments c in the GMM estimation, respectively. Jn(b, c) indicates the J test statistics
for testing overidentifying restrictions, constructed based on the parameters b and moments
c. Q is a parameter that meets Q > 2.
When selecting lag length m in corporate investment equation (11), we calculate the
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three types of MMSC criteria for the one- to three-lag models and then select a model that
minimizes each of these criteria. When calculating the MMSC-HQIC, we set the parameter
Q to Q = 2.1. Table A reports the calculated information criteria for each lag model. In
the models using the firm-level uncertainty shock (FIRM), all three MMSC criteria select
a zero lag for both capital investment and R&D in a robust manner. As for the two models
using the macro-level uncertainty shock, the MMSC-BIC and MMSC-HQIC seem to select
a zero lag for both capital investment and R&D, while the MMSC-AIC does not select a
particular lag and produces mixed results. As is well known, the BIC and HQIC are more
likely to select a shorter lag inherently, whereas the AIC selects a longer lag, although it
does not yield a robust result in our empirics. Given this, we adopt the zero-lag specification
for the firm’s capital investment and R&D spending.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
year R&D
Capital Cash Debt Stock
Sales Tobin’s Q
Invest. Flow Issue Issue
2001 0.023 0.040 0.046 0.018 0.002 0.924 0.987
(0.02) (0.035) (0.046) (0.077) (0.009) (0.3) (0.311)
2002 0.023 0.038 0.037 -0.036 0.001 0.853 0.936
(0.02) (0.035) (0.041) (0.062) (0.004) (0.303) (0.29)
2003 0.024 0.028 0.044 -0.021 0.001 0.890 0.898
(0.021) (0.03) (0.045) (0.068) (0.005) (0.313) (0.263)
2004 0.025 0.029 0.057 -0.003 0.001 0.946 1.056
(0.022) (0.032) (0.04) (0.064) (0.008) (0.324) (0.315)
2005 0.025 0.037 0.065 0.002 0.002 0.979 1.105
(0.022) (0.035) (0.042) (0.068) (0.008) (0.324) (0.292)
2006 0.025 0.041 0.064 0.015 0.002 1.000 1.240
(0.022) (0.04) (0.046) (0.068) (0.01) (0.322) (0.374)
2007 0.024 0.044 0.067 0.019 0.002 1.007 1.142
(0.022) (0.037) (0.045) (0.071) (0.01) (0.322) (0.344)
2008 0.024 0.041 0.064 -0.013 0.001 1.000 0.953
(0.022) (0.033) (0.05) (0.067) (0.006) (0.318) (0.277)
2009 0.024 0.031 0.032 -0.037 0.000 0.907 0.849
(0.021) (0.032) (0.056) (0.074) (0.004) (0.314) (0.25)
2010 0.024 0.029 0.051 -0.002 0.001 0.886 0.948
(0.022) (0.029) (0.053) (0.071) (0.007) (0.327) (0.299)
2011 0.024 0.030 0.065 0.002 0.001 0.940 0.917
(0.021) (0.03) (0.046) (0.07) (0.005) (0.308) (0.263)
2012 0.024 0.037 0.062 0.010 0.001 0.945 0.903
(0.022) (0.033) (0.046) (0.069) (0.005) (0.315) (0.256)
2013 0.024 0.046 0.062 0.005 0.001 0.931 0.936
(0.021) (0.038) (0.045) (0.067) (0.005) (0.311) (0.307)
2014 0.024 0.048 0.071 0.024 0.001 0.968 0.982
(0.021) (0.037) (0.041) (0.061) (0.006) (0.318) (0.331)
Total 0.024 0.037 0.056 -0.001 0.001 0.942 0.989
(0.021) (0.035) (0.048) (0.071) (0.007) (0.319) (0.317)
Note: The sample period is fiscal years 2001 to 2014, although we estimate the
models from 2004 to 2014 because we use two- and three-lagged variables as
instruments. The values in the rows and parentheses respectively report the
sample average and standard deviation for each year and total observations. All
the variables except for Tobin’s Q are scaled by total assets at the beginning of
the period. We preliminarily remove the outliers (i.e., those values three standard
deviations away from the mean).
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Table 2: Estimation Results for the Capital Investment Equation using System
GMM
Uncertainty Shock: FIRM FIRM FIRM VIXJ VIXJ EPUJ EPUJ
N of Lag: 0 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 0 Lag 0 Lag 0 Lag 0 Lag
Parameters: a0 and a0u
INVt−1 0.169*** 0.159*** 0.179*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 0.174*** 0.181***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
INVt−1*Ut−1 -0.138*** -0.251*** -7.070*** 0.275
(0.040) (0.055) (1.358) (0.202)
Parameters: bk (k = 0, 1)
CASHFLOWt 0.103*** 0.120* 0.267*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.138***
(0.030) (0.063) (0.057) (0.035) (0.022) (0.032) (0.030)
DEBTt 0.130*** 0.145*** 0.128*** 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.104***
(0.033) (0.036) (0.040) (0.028) (0.035) (0.030) (0.035)
STOCKISSUEt 0.073 -0.036 -0.139 -0.020 0.251 0.001 0.167
(0.324) (0.304) (0.295) (0.284) (0.423) (0.295) (0.228)
CASHFLOWt−1 -0.222
(0.200)
DEBTt−1 -0.142
(0.158)
STOCKISSUEt−1 -0.391
(0.818)
Parameters: bku (k = 0, 1)
CASHFLOWt*Ut -0.302* -0.060*** 2.191 2.715***
(0.169) (0.021) (2.596) (0.704)
DEBTt*Ut -0.229 -0.011* -0.183 -1.145
(0.178) (0.006) (4.221) (0.935)
STOCKISSUEt*Ut -0.536 -0.023 98.804 -11.014*
(1.197) (0.061) (61.304) (6.422)
CASHFLOWt−1*Ut−1 0.017
(0.042)
DEBTt−1*Ut−1 0.009
(0.024)
STOCKISSUEt−1*Ut−1 0.205
(0.236)
Parameters: cku (k = 0, 1)
Ut -0.005** 0.012 0.008 0.026 -0.314* -0.013 -0.120**
(0.002) (0.009) (0.011) (0.072) (0.179) (0.014) (0.047)
Ut−1 0.005*
(0.003)
TOBINQt 0.012* 0.005 -0.001 0.016*** 0.009 0.015*** 0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
SALESt−1 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Constant -0.013** -0.008 -0.009 -0.016*** -0.012* -0.015** -0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Dummy variable Year×Ind. Year×Ind. Year×Ind. Year×Ind. Year×Ind. Year×Ind. Year×Ind.
N 12303 12303 12303 12303 12303 12303 12303
N of IVs 371 383 385 371 383 371 383
Hansen test (p-value) 0.198 0.259 0.485 0.337 0.332 0.302 0.477
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1). p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). p-value 0.061 0.485 0.767 . 0.498 . 0.214
Note: The dynamic capital investment models from equation (11) are estimated using the Blundell–Bond system GMM.
The dependent variable is capital investment divided by total assets (INV). We use three types of uncertainty shocks
(U): the firm-level uncertainty shock (FIRM) and two macro-level uncertainty shocks extracted from the VIXJ and EPUJ.
Year×Ind. indicates the cross-terms of the time dummy and industrial dummy variables. The uncertainty shock, Year×Ind.
and two- and three-lagged values of all the explanatory variables are used as instrumental variables. Standard errors are
in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
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Table 3: Estimation Results for the R&D Equation using System GMM
Uncertainty Shock: FIRM FIRM FIRM VIXJ VIXJ EPUJ EPUJ
N of Lag: 0 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 0 Lag 0 Lag 0 Lag 0 Lag
Parameters: a0 and a0u
R&Dt−1 0.969*** 0.959*** 0.986*** 0.971*** 0.949*** 0.967*** 0.949***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021)
R&Dt−1*Ut−1 -0.020 -0.006 -0.320 0.087
(0.019) (0.020) (0.510) (0.136)
Parameters: bk (k = 0, 1)
CASHFLOWt 0.021** 0.024*** 0.020** 0.022** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.025***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
DEBTt -0.006 -0.007 0.004 -0.006 -0.011* -0.008 -0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
STOCKISSUEt 0.170* 0.091 0.068 0.155* 0.130 0.153 0.179**
(0.098) (0.080) (0.086) (0.088) (0.091) (0.097) (0.085)
CASHFLOWt−1 -0.006
(0.005)
DEBTt−1 -0.016***
(0.001)
STOCKISSUEt−1 -0.014
(0.014)
Parameters: bku (k = 0, 1)
CASHFLOWt*Ut -0.055 0.012 1.281** 0.530*
(0.039) (0.033) (0.555) (0.284)
DEBTt*Ut -0.017 -0.044 -0.345 -0.316
(0.035) (0.028) (0.683) (0.310)
STOCKISSUEt*Ut 0.349 0.237 31.988** 3.098
(0.293) (0.249) (15.741) (2.270)
CASHFLOWt−1*Ut−1 0.006
(0.007)
DEBTt−1*Ut−1 0.004
(0.005)
STOCKISSUEt−1*Ut−1 -0.004
(0.041)
Parameters: cku (k = 0, 1)
Ut -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.029 -0.102*** -0.001 -0.042**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.022) (0.040) (0.003) (0.018)
Ut−1 -0.000
(0.001)
TOBINQt -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SALESt−1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.005*** 0.004** -0.001 0.005*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy variable Year×Ind. Year×Ind. Year×Ind. Year×Ind. Year×Ind. Year×Ind. Year×Ind.
N 11202 11202 11202 11202 11202 11202 11202
N of IVs 345 361 363 345 361 345 361
Hansen test (p-value) 0.912 0.967 0.999 0.938 0.997 0.887 0.997
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1). p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). p-value 0.141 0.889 0.972 0.015 0.104 0.288 0.473
Test for b(R&Dt−) = 1 (p-value) 0.093 0.026 0.268 0.112 0.014 0.078 0.016
Note: The dynamic R&D investment models from equation (11) are estimated using the Blundell–Bond system GMM.
The dependent variable is R&D divided by total assets. The uncertainty shock, Year×Ind., and two- and three-lagged
values of all the explanatory variables are used as instrumental variables. See also the note of Table 2.
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Table 4: Estimation Results for Differenced R&D Spending using System GMM
Dependent Variable: Differenced R&D Spending
Uncertainty Shock: Firm-level Shock
N of Lag: 0 Lag 1 Lag
Parameter: a0u
R&Dt−1*Ut−1 -0.015 -0.022
(0.019) (0.020)
Parameters: bk (k = 0, 1)
CASHFLOWt 0.025*** 0.007
(0.009) (0.006)
DEBTt -0.009 0.006
(0.007) (0.004)
STOCKISSUEt 0.091 0.018
(0.077) (0.079)
CASHFLOWt−1 -0.005
(0.005)
DEBTt−1 -0.017***
(0.001)
STOCKISSUEt−1 -0.012
(0.013)
Parameters: bku (k = 0, 1)
CASHFLOWt*Ut -0.063 -0.003
(0.044) (0.032)
DEBTt*Ut -0.016 -0.013
(0.038) (0.022)
STOCKISSUEt*Ut 0.377 0.135
(0.309) (0.262)
CASHFLOWt−1*Ut−1 0.005
(0.007)
DEBTt−1*Ut−1 0.000
(0.004)
STOCKISSUEt−1*Ut−1 -0.008
(0.032)
Parameters: cku (k = 0, 1)
Ut 0.003 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Ut−1 -0.000
(0.002)
TOBINQt -0.001 0.003*
(0.002) (0.001)
SALESt−1 -0.004*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.000)
Constant 0.004** -0.003**
(0.002) (0.001)
Dummy variable Year×Ind. Year×Ind.
N 11202 11202
N of IVs 357 359
Hansen test (p-value) 0.986 0.998
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1). p-value 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). p-value 0.459 0.270
Note: The dynamic R&D investment models from equation (11) with the restric-
tion a0 = 1 are estimated using the Blundell–Bond system GMM. The dependent
variable is the differenced values of R&D divided by total assets. We use the same
instrumental variables as described in the note of Table 2.
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Table 5: Long-run Effects of Marginal Changes in the Financing Variables
(a) Capital Investment
Zero-lag Model
Lower Uncertainty Higher Uncertainty
CASHFLOW 0.271** 0.029
(0.125) (0.071)
DEBT 0.274*** 0.083
(0.08) (0.078)
STOCKISSUE 0.170 -0.230
(0.546) (0.600)
(b) R&D Investment
Zero-lag Model
Lower Uncertainty Higher Uncertainty
CASHFLOW 1.203 0.142
(0.752) (0.288)
DEBT -0.046 -0.264
(0.370) (0.325)
STOCKISSUE -0.596 4.268
(1.882) (3.967)
Note: We measure the long-run effects of marginal changes
in the financing variables on capital investment and R&D in-
vestment, as represented in equation (10), using the parameter
estimates of the zero-lag models in Tables 2 and 3. The 10th
percentile value of the firm-level uncertainty shock is defined
as the low uncertainty shock, while the 90th percentile value
is defined as the high uncertainty shock. Standard errors are
in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels of significance, respectively.
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Table 6: Estimation Results for the Capital Investment Equation using System
GMM: Effect of Cash Holdings
Uncertainty Shock: FIRM FIRM
CASHRICH: 50 percentiles 70 percentiles
Parameters: a0 and a0u
INVt−1 0.173*** 0.174***
(0.021) (0.019)
INVt−1*Ut−1 -0.162*** -0.133***
(0.040) (0.033)
Parameters: b0
CASHFLOWt 0.277*** 0.267***
(0.057) (0.051)
CASHFLOWt*CASHRICHt -0.233*** -0.199***
(0.068) (0.054)
DEBTt 0.114*** 0.114***
(0.047) (0.038)
STOCKISSUEt -0.100 0.049
(0.263) (0.275)
Parameters: b0u
CASHFLOWt*Ut -0.334 -0.389*
(0.234) (0.204)
CASHFLOWt*Ut*CASHRICHt 0.424*** 0.365*
(0.213) (0.188)
DEBTt*Ut -0.170 -0.226*
(0.141) (0.137)
STOCKISSUEt*Ut -0.514 -0.228
(0.640) (0.907)
Parameters: c0u
Ut 0.000 0.009
(0.010) (0.010)
TOBINQt 0.009 0.004
(0.007) (0.006)
SALESt−1 0.026*** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.006)
Constant -0.015* -0.009
(0.008) (0.008)
Dummy variable Year×Ind. Year×Ind.
N 12303 12303
N of IVs 383 383
Hansen test (p-value) 0.845 0.895
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1). p-value 0.000 .
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). p-value 0.238 0.076
Note: The dynamic capital investment models from equation (11) are es-
timated using the Blundell–Bond system GMM. The dependent variable
is capital investment divided by total assets (INV). We use the firm-level
uncertainty shock (FIRM) as the uncertainty shock (U). The indicators of
cash-rich firms are dummy variables taking one when the ratios of cash
holdings to total assets are in the 50th and 70th percentiles, respectively.
Year×Ind. indicates the cross-terms of the time dummy and industrial
dummy variables. The uncertainty shock, Year×Ind., and two- and three-
lagged values of all the explanatory variables are used as instrumental vari-
ables. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
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Table A: Information Criteria for Lag Selection:
Corporate Investment: Capital Investment R&D
Uncertainty Shock: FIRM VIXJ EPUJ FIRM VIXJ EPUJ
Zero-lag Model
BIC -1644.50 -1632.99 -1649.04 -1592.25 -1577.89 -1596.52
AIC -204.99 -193.48 -209.53 -213.85 -199.49 -218.12
HQIC -732.83 -721.32 -737.37 -721.68 -707.32 -725.95
One-lag Model
BIC -1459.98 -1470.01 -1490.14 -1533.14 -1559.39 -1563.03
AIC -174.70 -184.74 -204.87 -191.01 -217.26 -220.9
HQIC -645.98 -656.02 -676.15 -685.48 -711.72 -715.37
Two-lag Model
BIC -1425.18 -1442.87 -1414.06 -1490.52 -1520.18 -1484.6
AIC -176.62 -194.31 -165.50 -184.66 -214.32 -178.75
HQIC -634.44 -652.13 -623.32 -665.76 -695.42 -659.85
Three-lag Model
BIC -1392.86 -1394.28 -1393.12 -1476.48 -1498.41 -1468.42
AIC -181.03 -182.45 -181.29 -206.9 -228.83 -198.84
HQIC -625.38 -626.80 -625.64 -674.64 -696.57 -666.57
Note: We calculate three types of information criteria for the zero- to three-lag models, BIC,
AIC, and HQIC, as shown in Appendix II.
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Figure 1: Firm- and Macro-level Uncertainty Measures
Note: The three lines show the sample average of the three uncertainty measures calculated in each fiscal
year (horizontal axis). The solid line shows the firm-level idiosyncratic uncertainty (FIRM) calculated from
the volatility in the daily excess equity returns of each firm on the left vertical axis, while the dotted line
represents the VIXJ. The dashed line indicates the EPUJ on the right vertical axis. See Section 3.2.1 for the
details on each of the uncertainty measures.
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Figure 2: Firm- and Macro-level Uncertainty Shocks
Note: The three lines show the fiscal year-by-year sample average of the three uncertainty shocks. The solid
line, dotted line, and dashed line respectively represent the firm-level uncertainty shock (FIRM; left vertical
axis) and two macro-level uncertainty shocks extracted from the VIXJ (right vertical axis) and EPUJ (left
vertical axis). See Section 3.2.2. and Appendix I for the details of each of the uncertainty shocks.
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Figure 3: Estimated Dynamic Response of Capital Investment
Note: The solid line shows the dynamic response of capital investment to marginal changes in the financing
variables, estimated using equation (9). This dynamic response is calculated based on the system GMM
estimation results for the zero-lag model for capital investment. The horizontal axis corresponds to the
four-period-ahead response in equation (9). “Low” indicates the estimated response to the low uncertainty
shock, which is the 10th percentile value of the firm-level uncertainty shock, while “High” indicates that
to the high uncertainty shock, which is the 90th percentile. The shaded area denotes the 90% confidence
interval of the estimated response.
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Figure 4: Estimated Dynamic Response of R&D Investment
Note: The solid line shows the dynamic response of R&D investment to marginal changes in the financing
variables, estimated using equation (9). This dynamic response is calculated based on the system GMM
estimation results for the zero-lag model for R&D. See also the note of Figure 3.
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Figure 5: Confidence Sets for Cash Flow and its Interaction Effects
Note: The above figures present the projection-based confidence sets for the estimated coefficients on two
endogenous regressors: cash flow (horizontal axis) and its interaction term with the uncertainty shock (verti-
cal axis). The confidence sets are calculated based on the estimation results for the zero-lag model of capital
investment (panel (a)) and R&D investment (panel (b)) including the firm-level uncertainty shock (FIRM).
See Tables 2 and 3 for these estimation results. The confidence sets are robust to weak instruments under
the assumption that the coefficients on the other endogenous regressors are strongly identified. The number
of grid points searched is 302 = 900. The shaded areas for “Wald” and “J-K” show the pairs of hypothesized
values for the two coefficients that are not jointly rejected by the Wald and J-K (Kleibergen, 2005) tests.
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Figure 6: Estimated Dynamic Response of Capital Investment in Cash-rich and
Cash-poor Firms
Note: The solid line shows the dynamic response of capital investment to marginal changes in the variable
of cash flows, estimated using equation (9) with the interaction term of cash flow and the indicator variable
of cash holdings. Cash-rich firms are defined by the top 50th percentile of cash holdings to total assets,
while cash-poor firms have the lower ratio of the 50th percentile. This dynamic response is calculated based
on the system GMM estimation results for the zero-lag model for capital investment. The horizontal axis
corresponds to the four-period-ahead response in equation (9). “Low” indicates the estimated response to
the low uncertainty shock, which is the 10th percentile value of the firm-level uncertainty shock, while “High”
indicates that to the high uncertainty shock, which is the 90th percentile. The shaded area denotes the 90%
confidence interval of the estimated response.
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Figure A: Impulse Responses to the Uncertainty Shock:
Note: The solid lines show the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation uncertainty shock and the
shaded areas are the 90% confidence intervals.
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